Rothgery v. Gillespie County

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Contents

[edit] Briefs and Documents

Docket: 07-440

Argument Transcript

Issue: Whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to defendants brought before a magistrate and jailed pending posting of bond if prosecutors were not involved in the arrest or court appearance.

Merits briefs (Via ABA)

Amicus briefs

[edit] Pre-Argument Articles

[edit] Argument Preview

In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, No. 07-0440, the Court will consider when exactly adversarial proceedings have been initiated against an individual for purposes of triggering his Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel. The petitioner, Walter Rothgery, maintains that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested and brought before a magistrate who informed him of the accusation against him, found probable cause, and sent him to jail pending the posting of bail or the disposition of charges, but when respondent Gillespie County failed to appoint counsel for him until after he was indicted.

[edit] Background

On July 15, 2002, petitioner Walter Rothgery was arrested in Gillespie County, Texas, on suspicion of being a felon in possession of a firearm after a background check indicated that he had previously been convicted of a felony in California. Rothgery spent the night in jail and then was brought before a magistrate judge who, based on the arresting officer’s affidavit, found that probable cause existed for Rothgery’s arrest and set bail. Rothgery asked the magistrate to appoint counsel but then temporarily waived that right when he was informed that his request would delay setting bail and thus require him to return to jail. Rothgery posted bail and was released that day.

After six months, during which Rothgery alleges that he made repeated additional requests for appointed counsel, a grand jury indicted Rothgery on a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Because he was unable to post the increased bail that resulted from his indictment, Rothgery was returned to the Gillespie County Jail. Rothgery again requested appointed counsel, which he received six days after his indictment. After Rothgery had spent three weeks in jail, his counsel obtained an order that reduced his bail, thereby facilitating his release. His attorney also obtained records verifying that Rothgery had not in fact been convicted of a felony in California; on the basis of these records, the charges against Rothgery were dismissed on April 30, 2003.

Rothgery sued Gillespie County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the County’s policy of denying appointed counsel for indigent defendants until after indictment violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rothgery argued that he should have received appointed counsel after his first appearance before the magistrate, and that the mistake leading to his arrest would have been discovered sooner (and he would not have had to erroneously spend time in jail) had counsel been appointed then. The County moved for summary judgment, contending that Rothgery’s right to counsel did not attach until his indictment on January 17, 2003. The federal district court agreed.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that adversarial judicial proceedings do not commence without sufficient prosecutorial awareness and involvement and that in this case there is no evidence of prosecutorial awareness at the time of the initial hearing before the magistrate. The initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings, according to the Fifth Circuit, does not depend on “labels given to pretrial events,” but rather “the relevant time is when the government has committed itself to prosecute and a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society.” Such commitment to prosecute did not exist in this case because prosecutors were neither aware of nor involved in Rothgery’s arrest and appearance before the magistrate. Also, the police officer’s involvement cannot be imputed to the prosecutor and did not commit the government to prosecute, and so was insufficient to initiate adversarial judicial proceedings. Because adversarial judicial proceedings were not initiated, Rothgery’s right to counsel did not attach.

[edit] Petition for Certiorari

Rothgery filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted on December 3, 2007.

Rothgery’s petition advanced three arguments. First, Rothgery argued that the Fifth Circuit’s “prosecutorial involvement” test conflicts with the decisions of three other federal courts of appeals holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered by the same sequence of events that occurred in Rothgery’s case.” He also argued that two state supreme courts have expressly rejected a “prosecutorial involvement” test and that numerous other state courts have held that adversary judicial proceedings begin under facts similar to those in this case.

Second, Rothgery contended that the Fifth Circuit’s decision cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent, in particular the Court’s holdings in Brewer v. Williams (1977) and Michigan v. Jackson (1986). In both cases, according to Rothgery, the Court held that judicial proceedings had been initiated, and the right to counsel attached, following the arrest, initial appearance before a judge, and detention of the defendants. And in neither case, Rothgery emphasized, did the Court even suggest that the involvement of a prosecutor was a relevant factor in determining whether adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated. Rothgery dismissed the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to distinguish this case from Brewer and Jackson. The Court in Brewer explicitly held that adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated without reference to prosecutorial involvement, and did not rest its decision on a concession by the state. In Jackson, the Court again held that adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated without reference to prosecutorial involvement. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s assertion, the Court made this determination without relying on, or even mentioning, the Michigan Supreme Court opinion establishing prosecutorial involvement in the case.

Finally, Rothgery argued that the “prosecutorial involvement” test would be unworkable in practice and would lead to injustice, as indigent defendants could be jailed for long periods without counsel. The test requires courts to engage in an “unnecessarily fact-intensive, and ultimately unworkable, inquiry” to determine the extent of prosecutorial involvement. Furthermore, without access to counsel, indigent defendants who were arrested and jailed without a prosecutor being involved could be forced to wait in jail for long periods.

Respondent Gillespie County urged the Court to deny certiorari, arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was consistent with Supreme Court precedent and does not conflict with the other decisions cited by Rothgery. Regarding Supreme Court precedent, the County first cited Kirby, emphasizing that adversarial judicial proceedings begin only when the government has committed itself to prosecute. It further noted that the Court has recognized that the right to counsel serves the purpose of protecting the right to a fair trial, a right not implicated in this case. Accordingly, in United States v. Gouveia (1984), a case concerning two federal inmates held in administrative detention for nineteen months during an investigation for murder, the Court held that their detention alone did not initiate adversarial judicial proceedings absent a commitment to prosecute because no prejudice at trial resulted from such detention. Also, the County distinguished Brewer and Jackson, arguing that the proceedings at question in those cases were functionally different than the initial hearing in this case. The County distinguished the federal circuit court and state court decisions on the basis of state law, arguing that the proceedings in each case were sufficiently different from the initial hearing in this case to be legally distinct.

[edit] Merits Briefing

In his brief on the merits, Rothgery largely repeats the arguments he made in the petition. He begins by relying on Supreme Court precedent, which in his view establishes that his right to counsel attached following his initial appearance before the magistrate. In Kirby v. Ilinois (1972), the Court held that the right to counsel attaches at the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings. And in Brewer and later in Jackson, the Court confronted the same factual situation as presented in this case and determined that judicial proceedings had been initiated (and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel therefore triggered).

Second, Rothgery argues that the Fifth Circuit’s “prosecutorial involvement” test cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent such as Brewer or Jackson, in which the Court did not even address prosecutorial involvement. Moreover, Kirby focuses on the proceedings that have been initiated rather than on which parties initiated them. Once a judge has informed a defendant of the accusations against him and committed him to jail or bail, the “prosecutorial forces of organized society” are sufficiently aligned against the defendant to trigger the right to counsel, regardless of prosecutorial involvement.

Finally, Rothgery argues that the prosecutorial involvement test would be unworkable in practice and would potentially subject indigent defendants to substantial injustice. The test, according to Rothgery, would require a fact-intensive inquiry into prosecutors’ activities, which would be unnecessarily time consuming, intrusive on prosecutors, and place an unfair burden on defendants. Additionally, he claims, the test could work substantial injustice as indigent defendants could “spend months in jail, awaiting indictment, solely because they lack the skill to demonstrate their innocence and the funds to hire counsel to assist them.”

The County responds by first noting that the right to counsel serves to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, not to protect against unreasonable detention or guarantee a speedy trial, rights which are protected elsewhere in the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on assistance of counsel during the trial itself, and during critical stages of the post-indictment, pretrial proceedings. Additionally, in limited instances, the Court has recognized a right to counsel during adversarial pre-indictment hearings at which the presence of counsel might seriously affect the fairness of a later trial. The County argues that at no point before Rothgery’s indictment, including the initial appearance before the magistrate, was counsel necessary to ensure a fair trial, and thus the County did not violate his Sixth Amendment right.

Next, the County argues that Rothgery’s initial hearing before the magistrate did not entitle him to counsel, and no other event prior to his indictment could have triggered Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment right. Kirby, according to the County, established that the defendant’s right to counsel attaches at the point that formal charges are filed. Because, under Texas law, no charges were filed at the initial hearing, the Sixth Amendment right was not triggered. The County recognizes that the right to counsel might extend to a time prior to formal charges if the state has committed itself to prosecution or if a specific pre-indictment event implicates an individual’s right to a fair trial. But the County argues that in this case, the state did not commit itself to prosecution prior to Rothgery’s indictment, and the initial hearing was not adversarial and did not implicate his right.

Brewer and Jackson, according to the County, do not support petitioner’s arguments. The County argues that the arraignments in both those cases actually did differ from Rothgery’s. But more importantly, the County argues, the Court did not address whether the right to counsel had attached as a result of those proceedings and indeed did not discuss the proceedings in any detail in either case. And even if Rothgery did have a right to counsel at the initial hearing, the County contends, he waived that right, and there was no other event prior to his indictment that could have triggered Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment right.

Finally, the County argues that a holding for Rothgery in this case would dangerously extend the Sixth Amendment right both in practice and doctrinally. Practically, the County argues, Rothgery’s approach would impose a large burden on the government to provide counsel for individuals even in the absence of criminal proceedings. Also, outside of this cost, it would lead to a flood of litigation in the form of interlocutory appeals, habeas corpus claims, and § 1983 suits even in cases in which no quantifiable injury occurred. Doctrinally, the County argues that it would disrupt the Court’s constitutional framework by extending the right to counsel into areas properly addressed with other constitutional provisions such as the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

In his reply brief, Rothgery argues that the County distorts the question presented as well as the Court’s precedent. This case addresses a narrow question: whether a “criminal prosecution” commenced upon the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings, making Rothgery an “accused” and entitling him to counsel. The County, in its response, focuses on the separate and logically subsequent question of “critical stages” of the prosecution. The “critical stages” inquiry does not determine at what point the right to counsel attaches, but rather which proceedings, absent counsel, threaten substantial prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial. This “critical stages” inquiry only becomes relevant after the right to counsel attaches, and a “critical stage” is not necessary to initiate criminal prosecution itself.

The County’s distortion of the question presented, according to Rothgery, results from an incorrect reading of the Court’s precedent. The County places undue emphasis on the “critical stages” analysis because it misreads Kirby to hold that the right to counsel attaches only upon indictment or for exceptional stages prior to such indictment. Actually, Rothgery argues, the right attaches at the commencement of criminal proceedings, which occurred at Rothgery’s magistration when he was formally accused of a crime. The Court in Brewer and Jackson directly addressed this question, contrary to the County’s assertions, and held that criminal proceedings commenced under the same facts presented in this case. This result depends on federal law alone, rather than on the specifics of Texas law, but even application of Texas law would yield the same conclusion. Also, a ruling for Rothgery would not lead to the dramatic practical consequences warned of by the County, as his claim addresses only the narrow issue of whether the right to counsel attaches after the first judicial proceedings marking the defendant accused of a felony. A result in Rothgery’s favor would merely reaffirm the Court’s precedent and would not work a sea-change in criminal procedure; at least 45 jurisdictions, including the federal government, already appoint counsel under the facts in this case.

The “critical stages” inquiry, Rothgery continues, is not properly before the Court because the Fifth Circuit explicitly declined to address the issue. Therefore, the Court should not consider it absent extraordinary circumstances, which are not present in this case. However, even if the question were properly before the Court, it would not change the results of this case. The right to counsel not only ensures defendants a fair trial, but also assists them in combating “an erroneous or improper prosecution” prior to trial. Here, Rothgery had a right to an examining trial, which is a “critical stage” because it would have allowed him to contest the charges against him before his indictment. Rothgery was entitled to counsel’s assistance not only in the examining trial itself, but also in deciding whether to undergo the examining trial. Therefore, even under the “critical stages” inquiry, Rothgery’s right to counsel was violated.

[edit] Oral Argument Recap

At oral argument, the Court seemed to genuinely struggle with the scope of the right to counsel. While the Justices were disturbed by the possibility that a state could incarcerate an individual without charging him and without appointing counsel, they also raised practical concerns with requiring states to appoint counsel too early, seemed conflicted over the role “critical stages” must play in the analysis, and were unclear on whether the right to counsel is the relevant constitutional protection of individuals’ liberty interests at all. In the end, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were the only Justices who readily defended the state’s positions, and some consensus appeared to form around a rule that would require appointed counsel after an individual is incarcerated or released on bail, but the outcome remains unclear.

Arguing for petitioner Walter Rothgery, Danielle Spinelli started her argument by citing the Court’s decisions in Brewer and Jackson for the proposition that an initial appearance before a magistrate commences criminal proceedings, thus attaching the right to counsel. Chief Justice Roberts challenged the contention that Brewer and Jackson applied to the facts of this case, distinguishing them based upon prosecutorial involvement and questioning how, absent such involvement, the hearing in this case could be considered “adversarial.” Ms. Spinelli responded that the initial proceeding need not be adversarial to commence prosecution and noted that neither Jackson nor Brewer emphasized the role of prosecutors.

The Justices quickly moved away from the Fifth Circuit’s “prosecutorial involvement” test relied upon by the Fifth Circuit and would only revisit it briefly. Instead, Justice Kennedy first raised a topic that would take up much of the argument: how to identify “a specific rule to give to the States so the State knows when counsel has to be appointed.” In Justice Kennedy’s first pass at this issue, he questioned whether counsel would be required if the magistrate had issued a ticket. Ms. Spinelli responded that in that situation the individual would not be bound to reappear (and the need for appointed counsel would thereby be reduced) but seemed to allow that some weighing of the facts would still be necessary.

Justice Ginsburg next pressed upon a difficult part of Rothgery’s argument: his claim that the initial hearing served to commence criminal proceedings while not being an adversarial proceeding requiring counsel itself. Ms. Spinelli took the opportunity to differentiate the attachment issue from the critical stages question and argued that only the former was before the Court. However, when pressed further by Justice Alito, she acknowledged that the right only attached at the moment the magistrate found there to be probable cause and that counsel only needed to be appointed within some reasonable time after that point. Although Chief Justice Roberts took issue with Ms. Spinelli’s attempt to push aside the critical stages analysis, noting that if an individual is entitled to counsel absent a critical stage at an early point in the proceedings, then that counsel will essentially play an investigative function, Ms. Spinelli successfully parried for the moment with the help of Justice Kennedy who tried to get back to his ticket analogy.

Justice Scalia now spoke for the first time, indicating his concern with the incarceration in this case, and suggesting that it is the pivotal fact in the case. Ms. Spinelli agreed that the incarceration weighed heavily on the side of Rothgery becoming an accused entitled to counsel. Justice Scalia went even further, suggesting it was the incarceration of Rothgery that was unconstitutional, not the failure to appoint counsel. Ms. Spinelli would not go that far. Instead, she responded that the incarceration gave rise to special rights that were violated.

Justice Kennedy once again tried to nail down a rule: “What do we tell jurisdictions that have to deal with traffic tickets? Does it make a difference that you’re held in custody or not held in custody? I don’t understand the rule you want us to adopt.” Ms. Spinelli returned to Brewer and Jackson as establishing the rule Rothgery advocates – viz., that the right to counsel attaches upon the initial appearance before the magistrate. Justice Alito again pressed Ms. Spinelli on when exactly that right attaches, but Justice Souter came to her rescue, clarifying that counsel need only be appointed within a reasonable time after the initial appearance.

Justice Breyer seemed most concerned with the practical consequences for the states if the Court accepted Rothgery’s position. He questioned how states deal with the situation in which 500 protesters are brought to jail, required to put up bail, but then the state does not pursue charges on the condition that they forfeit bond as a fine. Ms. Spinelli began to answer that prosecution would not have begun, but Chief Justice Roberts asked why not if the individuals had been charged. Ms. Spinelli hedged and Justice Kennedy took the opportunity to raise his ticket hypothetical again.

Justice Scalia now raised the critical stages issue again, asking why requiring a critical stage before appointing counsel did not solve Justice Breyer’s practical problem. Ms. Spinelli again noted that the critical stages question was not before the Court, but Justice Scalia argued that the two questions are intertwined and that it would be easier for the Court to find that the right to counsel had attached at the initial hearing if counsel need not be actually appointed until a critical stage. Ms. Spinelli did not seem to fight that rule, instead arguing that even under that approach Rothgery was entitled to counsel because he had the right to demand an examining trial which would qualify as a critical stage. The Justices raised some concerns about when that critical stage would commence and whether Rothgery could have waived his right at the initial appearance, and Ms. Spinelli answered that he was not asked to waive that right and it would commence within some reasonable period after the initial appearance.

Justice Scalia then asked whether the Court could find a critical stage when no proceeding occurred, but instead Rothgery merely had the option of requesting such a proceeding. Ms. Spinelli cited Estelle v. Smith for the proposition that the right to counsel encompassed assistance in deciding what proceedings to undergo, not only in the proceedings themselves. This broader purpose of the right to counsel suggests that Rothgery indeed was entitled to that assistance. After some further peppering from Justice Kennedy on the ticket hypo and from Chief Justice Roberts on factual distinction from Brewer and Jackson, Ms. Spinelli reserved her time for rebuttal.

Gregory Coleman, arguing on behalf of the County, began his argument by stating that no charges had been filed in this case and Rothgery had no need of counsel prior to the indictment, but quickly ran into difficult questions from all sides regarding Rothgery’s incarceration. If no charges had been filed, Justice Kennedy asked, “then how could they hold [Rothgery] in jail?” Mr. Coleman responded that it is not uncommon for the police to arrest a person “to cease the crime that is taking place and perhaps to prevent other crimes from taking place” and to hold them without charging them. Justice Kennedy pressed him further, posing the ugly scenario on everyone’s mind: “suppose he had been held for three months and you couldn’t make bail, we don’t need counsel?” Before Mr. Coleman could answer, Justice Scalia asked what authority the state had to hold someone who had not been charged. Mr. Coleman pointed to rights in the Constitution other than the right to counsel, such as the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Justice Souter was unconvinced, incredulously examining the County’s claim that Rothgery could be held without charges for three weeks without right to counsel. Chief Justice Roberts volunteered that other rights would protect the indigent but the other Justices were not satisfied. Justice Scalia indicated that the scenario would pose a problem even if counsel were attached and Justice Souter drew laughter by asking if it would be constitutional for the state to keep an individual in jail without charging him and in response to his lawyer’s inquiries simply say “well, you know, that’s for us to know and you to find out?” Chief Justice Roberts again came to the state’s defense, answering for Mr. Coleman again that other constitutional rights would be at issue besides the right to appointed counsel.

Justice Breyer next pressed Mr. Coleman on the significance of the magistrate in this case, eventually winning an admission from Mr. Coleman that “magistrates have a great amount of discretion.” Justice Breyer than characterized the initial proceeding: “In this case we have before us bringing this person before a State official who himself has the power to decide if there is probably cause to hold him, and he is saying, yes, there is probable cause to hold him.” Justice Stevens further questioned whether the absence of the prosecutor in this case was significant. Mr. Coleman answered no, unless the prosecutor filed charges. Under additional questioning, Mr. Coleman moved away from the prosecutorial involvement test outlined by the Fifth Circuit and instead embraced a test that looks only at whether formal charges have been brought.

The Justices, led by Justice Scalia, further questioned Mr. Coleman on how an individual can be incarcerated without some charges, or at least a complaint being filed by the police. Mr. Coleman responded that no charges or complaint were filed in response to questioning by Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg switched tacks, inquiring into the rights read to Rothgery by the magistrate which included a right to counsel. Mr. Coleman said that this right arose under Texas law but not the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Alito raised Rothgery’s argument that the possibility of an examining trial should qualify as a critical stage asking why the Court should differentiate between the situation when such a trial is optional rather than mandatory. “Because there is no prejudice to your fair trial rights from not choosing to have an examining trial,” Mr. Coleman answered. While proceedings at an examining trial without assistance of counsel could prejudice an individual’s right to fair trial, the mere choice whether to pursue those proceedings do not.

Justice Kennedy then brought the discussion back to identifying a workable rule, asking whether requiring appointed counsel whenever a defendant is ordered held in custody would contradict the Court’s precedent. Mr. Coleman argued that it would contradict multiple cases and that being held in custody does not make a constitutional difference. Justice Breyer attempted his own rule in which the state would have to appoint counsel when it imposes significant restraints on an individual’s liberty for the purpose of bringing that individual to trial, but not if the purpose, like the one in Gouveia, is to keep the prison or society safe. Mr. Coleman did not respond to Justice Breyer’s assertion that that rule would not raise significant practical problems, but instead returned to the argument that appointed counsel are meant to protect the right to a fair trial and that other constitutional rights protect individuals’ liberty interests. Justice Ginsburg pressed him on that assertion, raising the examining trial as a proceeding entitling an individual to counsel even though it does not affect the right to fair trial itself. But Mr. Coleman disagreed with Justice Ginsburg, arguing that the very reason counsel is required at the examining trial is precisely because an uninformed defendant might unwittingly waive defenses without such assistance. which would affect the trial itself.

Mr. Coleman pivoted to Justice Breyer’s earlier hypothetical concerning 500 individuals arrested at a demonstration. Under Rothgery’s proposed rule, Mr. Coleman asserted, the County would be required to appoint counsel to all of those individuals. “Only if they ask for the lawyer,” Justice Stevens qualified. Also, “no counsel is required if there’s no incarceration,” Justice Souter reminded. When Mr. Coleman responded that Rothgery had been released on bond, Justice Breyer answered that bail “in effect is incarceration” and clarified that the reason he posed the hypothetical was because he understood that in a lot of other states counsel do attach under the circumstances of this case. Justice Breyer hoped to understand how they dealt with the situation to understand any practical difficulties with the rule. When Mr. Coleman responded that those other states do not treat the situation significantly differently than Texas, Justice Breyer remarked that Texas would have appointed counsel at the magistration if Rothgery had requested it, so it cannot be such a significant problem after all.

Justice Stevens next launched into an extended dialogue with Mr. Coleman establishing the role of a lawyer under Texas procedure in helping a client who is out on bail but has not been charged. Mr. Coleman had to admit that the state would allow a lawyer to help his client confront such a scenario but denied that the County is therefore constitutionally obliged to appoint a counsel for that purpose.

Justice Alito brought Mr. Coleman back to the issue of critical stages, asking what the difference is between having the right to counsel attach and having the right to have counsel appointed. Mr. Coleman answered that the entire inquiry must turn on the critical stage question of whether a state must appoint counsel for a particular proceeding to ensure an individual’s right to a fair trial. Justice Ginsburg, though, pointed out that the right is not “episodic” and does not go away in between critical stages. Rather, “you only need this one critical stage, and then you get appointed counsel at that stage, and that counsel will continue thereafter.”

Justice Kennedy returned to the practical concerns raised by this case, asking Mr. Coleman how many people currently are incarcerated in Texas after a probable cause determination without appointed counsel. Mr. Coleman responded that the Fair Defense Act prevents such problems from occurring, to which Justice Kennedy answered, “Then I am not sure why we are having this discussion.” Mr. Coleman responded that because Mr. Rothgery was released on bail, the county was not authorized to appoint counsel.

Mr. Coleman ended his oral arguments by responding to Justice Souter’s questions about the nature of the examining trial and whether a magistrate can find probable cause if no charges have been filed. Mr. Coleman maintained that in Texas probable cause is determined prior to charges being filed.

Before Ms. Spinelli could even start her rebuttal, Justice Kennedy observed that “if we are going to give you relief, we have to go beyond what Gerstein says.” Ms. Spinelli responding by distinguishing the probable-cause determination in Gerstein from the initial proceeding in this case, in which Rothgery acquired specific rights, including the right to appointed counsel. But then “Texas would be better off if they didn’t have a magistration proceeding at all,” Chief Justice Roberts observed. Ms. Spinelli responded that the fact that 45 jurisdictions do appoint counsel following an initial appearance indicates that states do not view this process as a burden and that the initial appearance serves an important substantive purpose. Allowed an additional minute by Chief Justice Roberts, Ms. Spinelli finished her argument by explaining that there are two phases to a felony prosecution in Texas and that the County’s rule would limit the right to the second phase, a limitation the Court has repeatedly rejected.

[edit] Opinion Analysis

[edit] Links and further information

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