Forest Grove School District v. T. A.

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Author: Tiffany Cartwright

Contents

[edit] Briefs and Documents

Docket: 08-305

Issue: Whether parents of a student who has never previously received special education services from a school district may be eligible under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for reimbursement of private school tuition. (Note: the Court granted certiorari to resolve this question in Board of Education of New York v. Tom F. (06-637) but affirmed the opinion below by an equally divided vote.)

Merit briefs

Amicus briefs

Oral argument: Transcript

Decision: Affirmed in an opinion by Justice Stevens

[edit] Pre-Argument Articles

[edit] Argument Preview

Whether parents of a student who has never previously received special education services from a school district may be eligible under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for reimbursement of private school tuition. The Court previously granted certiorari to resolve this question in Board of Education of New York v. Tom F., but affirmed the opinion below by an equally divided vote after Justice Kennedy recused himself from the case.


The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) seeks to ensure that all children with disabilities receive a “free appropriate public education.” School districts that fail to provide such an education can be ordered to reimburse a child and his parents for the cost of private education. Prior to 1997, courts based these reimbursement orders on the broad language of 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(C), which provides that in suits under the IDEA, a court “shall grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate”; in School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, the Court construed this language to authorize reimbursement for parents who unilaterally placed their child in private school when the services provided by the public school were inadequate.


In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA and specifically addressed private school reimbursement in 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C). Clause (ii) of that section provides (as relevant here) that a family can be reimbursed when a child with a disability has “previously received special education and related services” from a school district. In this case, the Court will decide whether that language precludes reimbursement for students who have never received special education services.


[edit] Background

Respondent T.A. is a former student of petitioner Forest Grove School District. He attended Forest Grove public schools from kindergarten until halfway through his junior year in high school, when his parents enrolled him in a residential private school. While in school, T.A. experienced difficulty paying attention and completing schoolwork, but a 2001 evaluation concluded that he did not have any learning disabilities. Although school officials also suspected that he had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), he was not evaluated for that condition, and his parents were not informed of the school’s suspicions.

In 2003, T.A.’s parents took him to a psychologist, who diagnosed him with ADHD, depression, math disorder, and cannabis abuse and recommended that he be placed in a residential program. His parents followed that advice and removed T.A. from Forest Grove.

T.A.’s parents then hired a lawyer and requested an administrative hearing pursuant to the IDEA. Before the hearing, Forest Grove again evaluated T.A. Although the evaluators agreed with the psychologist’s diagnoses, they nonetheless concluded that he was not eligible under the IDEA because those diagnoses did not have a severe effect on his educational performance. In the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer rejected the school’s conclusions, instead holding that T.A. was disabled, that he was eligible for special education under the IDEA, that Forest Grove had failed to offer him a free appropriate public education (FAPE), and that he was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of his new private school.

Forest Grove appealed to the district court, which agreed with the Hearing Officer’s findings of fact – notably, that T.A. was disabled and thus entitled to special education – but held that T.A. was ineligible for reimbursement because he had not “previously received special education and related services” from Forest Grove.

T.A. appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which initially held the case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Tom F. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed. It held that the statutory requirements of Section 1412(a)(10)(C) simply don’t apply to children – such as T.A. – who have not previously received special education services, and that relief is still available pursuant to Section 1415(i)(2)(C), which authorizes general equitable relief. The panel emphasized that IDEA’s purpose is to provide all disabled children with a FAPE, and that creating a categorical bar for some children would be contrary to that purpose. Moreover, it reasoned, the district court’s reading of the statute would lead to “absurd results”: parents would be forced to wait for public school services before transferring their child “no matter how inappropriate” the public education, and a student who was incorrectly deemed not disabled would never receive services and therefore never be eligible for reimbursement.

[edit] Petition for Certiorari

In its petition for certiorari, Forest Grove School District presents two arguments (in addition to the cert. grant in Tom F.) for granting the writ. First, it notes that the circuits are split on the issue: three circuits (the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh) hold that reimbursement is still permitted for students such as T.A., while the First Circuit holds that prior receipt of special education services is a “threshold” requirement for reimbursement. Second, Forest Grove argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision is wrong on the merits. Noting that the IDEA was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Forest Grove argues that the statute does not provide “clear notice” that it is imposing an obligation to compensate parents whose children have not previously received special education services. Furthermore, Forest Grove contends, rules of statutory construction and the legislative history of the IDEA support its interpretation of the statute.

In opposing certiorari, T.A. first argues that this case is a poor vehicle for review of the question presented because there has been no final judgment in this case. Instead, the Ninth Circuit merely remanded the case to the district court, which has yet to determine whether or not T.A. has a disability and if so, if he is entitled to reimbursement under equitable principles. Second, T.A. contends that Forest Grove has overstated the nature of the circuit split. Third, T.A. notes both that Forest Grove failed to advance its Spending Clause argument in the lower courts and that the Spending Clause is in any event irrelevant as it involves a proper remedy for a violation of the IDEA; the only substantive obligation imposed on the states is to provide disabled students with a FAPE, and the statute provides clear notice for that. Finally, T.A. defends the decision of the Ninth Circuit, mostly on the basis of the goals of the IDEA and commentary by the Department of Education.

[edit] Merits Briefing

In its merits brief, Forest Grove advances two major arguments. First, it reiterates its Spending Clause argument: because the IDEA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power, it must provide clear notice of any conditions that are attached to a state’s acceptance of federal funds. Here, however, the IDEA plainly prohibits reimbursement for students who have not previously received special education services. Forest Grove points to the plain text of the statute, noting that the titles of the relevant subsections make it clear that they apply to all students who are enrolled in a private school without the district’s consent, and that the text of the sections themselves make clear that reimbursement is only appropriate for a child “who previously received special education and related services.” This is the only provision of the IDEA that expressly authorizes tuition reimbursement, and Congress’s express action here suggests that it did not intend implicit authorization elsewhere in the statute. Moreover, the legislative history of the 1997 amendments indicates that Congress intended to limit the availability of tuition reimbursement, rather than add to or clarify what was already available. Finally, even if the IDEA does not clearly bar students such as T.A. from reimbursement, it is at most ambiguous, and the Spending Clause requires that any ambiguity be resolved in favor of the school district.

Forest Grove then addresses the rationales of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. First, it argues that the broad purpose of the IDEA—to ensure that all disabled children receive a FAPE—does not require reimbursement for T.A. Although that purpose is important, it cannot be promoted at the expense of all other considerations, especially when the 1997 amendments were intended to limit liability for tuition reimbursement. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Burlington, which authorized tuition reimbursement prior to the 1997 amendments, is misplaced, as that decision was effectively superseded by the 1997 amendments and the student at issue in that case had received prior special education services. Third, commentary by the Department of Education is not entitled to deference because it is contrary to the clear language of the IDEA, exceeded the scope of the Department’s delegated authority, and contradicts the requirement of the Spending Clause that any obligation must be unambiguously imposed by the statute itself. Finally, Forest Grove disputes the Ninth Circuit’s prediction that “absurd results” would flow from the denial of reimbursement to students who had not previously received services. To the contrary, it argues, the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates “absurd results” by reducing the burden on parents who have not followed the standard IEP process and attempted to keep their children in public schools.

In his merits brief, T.A. first responds by asserting that the plain language of the IDEA permits tuition reimbursement whenever a school district fails to make a FAPE available. T.A. points to the first subsection in Section 1412(a)(10)(C), an express “safe harbor” provision which provides that tuition reimbursement is not required if a school district “made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” This express provision in subsection (C)(i), T.A. argues, precludes any “implied safe harbor” under (C)(ii), the subsection at issue in this case: if Congress had meant to create additional categorical bars to reimbursement it would have done so in (C)(i).

This reading of the statute – where the only categorical bar to reimbursement is found in (C)(i) – also harmonizes and gives meaning to all provisions of the IDEA, according to T.A. It does so by viewing (C)(i) as the “general rule” for tuition reimbursement, making reimbursement available in all cases except where the school district has provided a FAPE, and viewing (C)(ii) and (C)(iii) as governing the particular application of (C)(i). Subsection (C)(ii) identifies a particular class of cases that were of particular concern to Congress – cases in which there was already an ongoing relationship between parents and the school district providing services – and (C)(iii) provides limiting factors to ensure that such an ongoing relationship is not terminated prematurely. When a school district fails to make any services available in the first place, or even worse, fails to identify a student’s disability entirely, subsections (C)(ii) and (C)(iii) simply do not apply. It cannot be the case, T.A. emphasizes, that parents who attempt diligently to secure services for their child from a public school are then denied reimbursement if the school wrongfully denies them any services. This construction, T.A. argues, not only follows from the plain language of the statute but is consistent with the purpose and legislative history of the IDEA.

T.A. then briefly argues that the Department of Education has interpreted the IDEA in his favor, and that those interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference. Finally, and perhaps in an attempt to signal its lack of importance, T.A. addresses Forest Grove’s Spending Clause argument. After reiterating that this argument was not raised below, T.A. claims that no separate notice is required for tuition reimbursement because that obligation is inherent in the obligation to provide a FAPE. Furthermore, clear notice is provided by subsection (C)(i), which expressly provides that the only limitation on tuition reimbursement is where the district has actually provided a FAPE, and by the Department of Education’s commentary.

[edit] Oral Argument Recap

At Tuesday’s oral argument in Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the Supreme Court considered whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) categorically bars tuition reimbursements to parents who place their child in private school without the child first receiving special education services from a public school .

Gary Feinerman appeared first for petitioner Forest Grove. Although he began by discussing the plain language of the statute and the implications of the Spending Clause (the two major arguments in Forest Grove’s merits brief), Justice Ginsburg quickly steered the argument toward the practical implications of the case, asking if a child who does not receive a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) because a school district failed to provide services at all would ever be entitled to reimbursement.

No, Mr. Feinerman argued. If Congress had meant for any child who did not receive a FAPE to be entitled to reimbursement, it would not have bothered writing the express provisions addressing tuition reimbursement in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)-(iv). If a school makes an incorrect determination about a child’s diagnosis, he continued, that can be remedied by other provisions within the IDEA, which provide strict time limits for administrative review – although, as Justice Souter then pointed out, if judicial review is sought after administrative remedies have been exhausted, there is no time limit whatsoever.

Continuing to focus on the implementation of the IDEA, the discussion turned to what exactly parents must do to qualify for reimbursement under Forest Grove’s interpretation of the statute – that is, what qualifies as “special education and related services.” Mr. Feinerman argued that even when a school district believes a child is not entitled to services at all, and seeks to appeal the decision of a hearing officer finding otherwise, it will create a provisional Individual Education Plan (IEP) for the child while the appeal is pending. At that point, the parents could qualify for reimbursement merely by trying the IEP for at least ten days. The Justices seemed to view the ten-day requirement differently: Justice Souter pointed out that it was a formalistic requirement that probably wouldn’t accomplish anything for parents who truly believed the IEP was inadequate; the Chief Justice, on the other hand, seemed to take the position that because the ten-day period placed such a low burden on parents, the potentially adverse effects of Forest Grove’s argument were being overstated.

Although Mr. Feinerman then attempted to steer the argument back towards the text of the statute, Justice Kennedy (whose recusal in Board of Education of New York v. Tom F. – a case that presented the same question – left the Court tied four-to-four) weighed in with his view of the case. In Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the problem with T.A.’s view of the statute is that it gives too little meaning to Subsection C(ii), but Forest Grove’s view is “formalistic” and seems to “encourage intransigence.” To resolve these tensions, Kennedy suggested that when a child has not previously received special education services, the Court adopt a presumption in favor of the school district’s diagnosis and/or IEP. The parents would not be categorically barred from receiving reimbursement, but would have to overcome the presumption in favor of the school district by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Feinerman agreed that if the Court were to reject Forest Grove’s position, they would have the authority to adopt such a presumption.

The Chief Justice then asked if the initial determination of a child’s eligibility for special education could qualify as “related services” under Subsection C(ii), thus bringing children like T.A. who were determined ineligible within its ambit. Mr. Feinerman rejected this suggestion, and reserved the rest of his time for rebuttal.

David Salmons then appeared on behalf of respondent T.A. The Chief Justice began the question by going back to the ten-day requirement: what was so unreasonable about requiring parents to try out the public school’s services for ten days? This brought the Court back into a discussion of how IEPs actually work, and whether such a requirement would in fact be difficult for parents who disagreed with the proposed IEP.

Justice Scalia then brought up the issue of statutory interpretation, which had been the main focus of the merits brief, challenging T.A.’s interpretation of Subsection C(i). C(i) provides that school districts are not liable for reimbursement when they have provide a student with a FAPE; that does not necessarily mean, Scalia pressed, that a district which does not provide a FAPE must provide tuition reimbursement in every case. Mr. Salmons responded that Forest Grove’s interpretation adopts the same sort of “negative implication” with respect to Subsection C(ii), and then reiterated T.A.’s stance that C(ii) merely identifies further requirements for a specific class of cases that were important to Congress.

Justice Breyer then made a suggestion similar to Justice Kennedy’s presumption in favor of the school district: perhaps in the usual case a student would be required to try out a public school’s services first, but in exceptional circumstances courts could award reimbursement as a matter of equity to students who had not received prior services. Mr. Salmons quickly agreed, noting that this was basically T.A.’s argument.

The Court then turned to the question of where a hearing officer in an administrative IDEA proceeding gets the authority to order tuition reimbursement in the first place. Mr. Salmons pointed to a section of IDEA that grants parents the right to present complaints with respect to “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a FAPE to such child.” Justice Scalia pressed him on whether that really included an authorization of power to grant tuition reimbursement, but Mr. Salmons emphasized that that is how the statute has been repeatedly interpreted. Ultimately, this line of questioning just led to agreement among the Justices that hearing officers in administrative proceedings and courts in judicial review of those proceedings should be able to grant the same types of relief.

Assistant Solicitor General Eric Miller appeared next on behalf of the United States as an amicus curiae supporting the respondent. He reiterated the seeming inconsistency that if Forest Grove had provided T.A. with special education services that were later determined to be inadequate, there would be no question about his right to tuition reimbursement, but since they provided no services at all, they claim that they are “categorically immune from such an award.” The Chief Justice, alluding to the earlier discussion about how even school districts that believe services should be denied will create a provisional IEP when a hearing officer rules against them, wanted Mr. Miller to focus on the parents who refuse an IEP once it is offered by the school district.

Mr. Miller responded by noting that Forest Grove’s interpretation of the statute does not solve the problem raised by the Chief Justice. Forest Grove argues that all that is required is special education “services” at some point; because a new IEP is developed each year, parents could refuse a new IEP at any time and still be eligible for reimbursement, so long as their child has received services previously. Forest Grove’s interpretation would only apply to parents who reject the very first proposed IEP.

Justice Kennedy again suggested the idea of a presumption in favor of the school district’s diagnosis and plan that could only be overcome by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that reimbursement was appropriate. Mr. Miller pointed out that the statute specifies that administrative and judicial proceedings under IDEA are governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard, but that a hearing officer should certainly show some deference to a school district’s expertise.

The Chief Justice then – for the first time, despite its prominent appearance in Forest Grove’s briefs – addressed the Spending Clause, asking Mr. Miller what percentage of the state’s financial obligations under IDEA are reimbursed by the federal government. When Mr. Miller estimated that number at ten to twelve percent, the Chief Justice then questioned him on whether the Court should take that into account when deciding whether or not to “vastly expand liability” for school districts. Mr. Miller disputed that characterization, pointing to statistics in an amicus brief indicating that unilateral placement of students in private schools is actually very rare.

Mr. Feinerman then rose to give his rebuttal on behalf of Forest Grove. He used his remaining time to dispute the suggestion that the regulations granting authority to hearing officers would include the power to grant tuition reimbursement to students such as T.A., and that even if T.A. were to prevail, only the courts would be able to award reimbursement to similarly situated students.

[edit] Opinion Analysis

Today, the Supreme Court held that parents of disabled children can seek reimbursement for private education expenses regardless whether their child had previously received special-education services from a public school. By a vote of six to three, the Court held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) authorizes reimbursement whenever a public school fails to make a free appropriate public education (FAPE) available to a disabled child. Interestingly, the Court granted certiorari on the same question in 2007 but affirmed the opinion below by an equally divided court (Justice Kennedy recused himself), indicating that at least one Justice changed his or her vote.

Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, relied heavily on the Court’s previous decisions in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, which held that the provision authorizing a court to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” Section 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), included private school reimbursement.

The children in those cases received Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) and the ensuing services from their public school districts, but their parents claimed the IEPs were inadequate. In this case, T.A. never received an IEP or any services at all. Those factual differences, the Court explained today, are irrelevant. The reasoning of Burlington applies equally to a child who has not received an IEP, and reimbursement is authorized unless the 1997 amendments to the IDEA require a different result.

Turning to those amendments, the Court held that they did not change the text of the provision interpreted in Burlington to authorize reimbursement, and Congress is presumed to have adopted the Court’s interpretations when it reenacts a statute without change. The Court then rejected Forest Grove’s argument that one of the new provisions, Section 1412(a)(10)(C), was intended by Congress to abrogate Burlington. Although it only discusses reimbursement for children who have previously received special education services, that does not mean IDEA only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance. The text does not expressly prohibit reimbursement for other children, and such an interpretation would be at odds with the remedial purpose of IDEA and the 1997 amendments. Ultimately, the clauses of Section 1412(a)(10)(C) are “best read as elucidative rather than exhaustive.”

Finally, the Court also rejected the argument that the obligation to provide reimbursement was not stated unambiguously pursuant to the Spending Clause. The Court held that reimbursement was merely a part of the obligation to provide a FAPE, and that in any event the States had been put on notice by Burlington.

Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, agreed with Forest Grove that Section 1412(a)(10)(C) was meant to limit reimbursement to children who had previously received special education services from a public school. The dissenters regarded the majority’s reading as implausible because it renders the provisions in that section superfluous.

[edit] Links and further information

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